Kornilov's mutiny. The four events were closely connected with one another and represented consecutive phases of the same process.

The Cabinet formed after the July days, with the consent of the moderates in the All-Russian Executive Committee, represented a setback for the cause of democracy. Yielding to the pressure from the right, we saddled ourselves with an intolerable burden—a government that represented nobody and could not command the respect of the people. The Cabinet's decision to postpone elections to the Constituent Assembly was a new victory for the right. It further weakened the prestige of the moderates with the masses and brought the Communists closer to victory. There would have been no "ten days that shook the world" in November if the Constituent Assembly had been elected in September, as the first Coalition Government had promised in May!

The most terrible blow to the democratic regime was Kornilov's mutiny—not its final phase, after the break between Kornilov and Kerensky, but its initial phase, the Mogilev plot to use troops against their will to liquidate the Soviets. The democratic parties finally lost the army by tolerating in the government persons who had been involved in this conspiracy.

These mistakes of the moderates in the Soviets stemmed from a common source. In each case, the democratic leaders made concessions to the right because they were not sure of their own strength and were reluctant to shoulder entire responsibility for the government. Each time, yielding to the right, they sacrificed their own real power in a futile hope of gaining support from quarters that actually had nothing to offer because they lacked the support of the masses of the Russian people.

Ultimately our weak policy sprang from lack of unity within the ranks of democracy and lack of will to power among its leaders.